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A Cartesian argument for skepticism about the external world runs as follows. First: we cannot
know that the evil-demon hypothesis is false, where the evil-demon hypothesis says that all of our
sensory experiences have been produced by an evil demon. Second: if we cannot know that the
evil-demon hypothesis is false, we cannot know we have hands. Conclusion: We cannot know we
have hands. Generalizing: as a version of the second premise holds for arbitrary empirical claims
about the external world, we cannot know any such claims to be true.
Here the evil-demon hypothesis is put forward as a global skeptical hypothesis: a single hy-
pothesis whose possible truth threatens knowledge of arbitrary empirical claims all at once. Other
putative global skeptical hypotheses include the brain-in-vat hypothesis, holding that we are per-
manently envatted brains; the simulation hypothesis, holding that we have lived our lives in a
computer simulation; and certain versions of the dream hypothesis, holding that we have always
been dreaming.
I will call these putative global skeptical hypotheses Cartesian hypotheses, and the scenarios
that they specify Cartesian scenarios. They do not all come from Descartes, and Descartes also
put forward other sorts of skeptical scenario, but these scenarios have exerted an especially strong
grip on the philosophical imagination. My focus here is on skepticism about the external world,
so I will restrict my attention (and the label “Cartesian”) to scenarios in which a subject’s physical
environment is varied globally, keeping the subject’s experiences the same. Scenarios in which
only other minds are absent or in which an evil demon is interfering with one’s own mind also
raise important skeptical issues, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
Cartesian hypotheses contrast with local skeptical hypotheses, whose possible truth threatens
empirical claims a few at a time. For example, the painted-mule hypothesis, holding that one is
currently looking at a mule painted with black and white stripes, threatens knowledge that one
0Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy. Thanks to Jonathan Vogel and a reviewer for comments, and to audi-
ences at ANU, Bled, NYU, Rio de Janiero, USC, Sydney, and Villa de Leyva for discussion.
1
is looking at a zebra. Local skeptical hypotheses suffice for many skeptical purposes. Even if
every empirical belief were threatened by a different local skeptical hypothesis, that would be
enough to threaten all of our empirical knowledge. Nevertheless, global skeptical hypotheses
yield a particularly strong form of skepticism, which we might call global skepticism. If global
skepticism is correct, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are entirely out of touch with the
external world. My focus here will be almost entirely on arguments for global skepticism, with
local skeptical hypotheses set to one side.
Perhaps the best-known responses to global skeptical arguments deny the first premise, hold-
ing that we can know that the Cartesian hypotheses are false. These include theist replies (such as
Descartes’s) where we know this through reasoning about god; dogmatist replies (such as Moore’s)
on which we know this through perceptual evidence; abductivist replies (such as Russell’s) on
which we know this by inference to the best explanation; and incoherentist replies (such as Put-
nam’s) on which Cartesian hypotheses are ruled out a priori as incoherent or contradictory.
I will focus on a response to global skepticism that denies the second premise. The general line
of response I have in mind is veridicalist, holding that subjects in Cartesian scenarios have mainly
true beliefs. On this line, even if the evil-demon hypothesis is true, I still have hands, and so on.
Given this, my inability to rule out the evil-demon hypothesis does not rule out my knowing that I
have hands. The specific veridicalist line of response I have in mind is structuralist: most of our
claims about the external world (that I have hands, for example) are equivalent to structural claims,
and these claims will be correct even for subjects in Cartesian scenarios, roughly because those
scenarios have the right structure. I will discuss veridicalist lines in general in the next section,
and structuralism specifically in what follows.
Veridicalist Responses
Veridicalist responses to skepticism can be motivated though a number of quite different philo-
sophical positions, including idealism, phenomenalism, verificationism, coherentism, externalism,
and structuralism.
The idealist and phenomenalist thesis that appearance constitutes reality yields a straightfor-
ward path to veridicalism. In a Cartesian scenario, it systematically appears that one has hands.
Given that systematic appearance that one has hands constitutes one’s having hands, it follows that
one has hands. The same goes for other aspects of external reality. Surprisingly, Berkeley never
discusses Descartes’s skeptical hypotheses explicitly. Perhaps he would hold the evil-demon hy-
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pothesis to be incoherent, since he thinks that only a god could produce sensory appearances with
the coherence and complexity of ours. But Berkeley’s thesis that god produces our experiences is
at least a cousin of the evil-demon hypothesis, and Berkeley certainly thinks that given his thesis
about god, our beliefs and experiences are accurate.
The locus classicus of a veridicalist response to global skepticism is O.K. Bouwsma’s 1949
article “Descartes’ Evil Genius”. Here Bouwsma argues that although the evil demon tries to
deceive us, it does not succeed. As he sums things up:
I have tried in this essay to understand the boast of the evil genius. His boast was that
he could deceive, deceive about “the heavens, the earth, the colors, figures, sound,
and all other external things.” In order to do this I have tried to bring clearly to mind
what deception and such deceiving would be like. Such deception involves illusions
and such deceiving involves the creation of illusions... [I]t is assumed that the illusion
is of such a kind that no seeing, no touching, no smelling, are relevant to detecting
the illusion. Nevertheless the evil genius sees, touches, smells, and does detect the
illusion. He made the illusion; so, of course, he must know it. How then does he
know it? The evil genius has a sense denied to men. He senses the flower-in-itself,
Milly-in-herself, etc [...] He has certainly created his own illusions, though he has not
himself been deceived. But neither has anyone else been deceived. For human beings
do not use the word “illusion” by relation to a sense with which only the evil genius
is blessed. (Bouwsma 1949, pp. 150-51)
Bouwsma’s idea can be put by saying that an illusion requires the possibility of discovery. If
the evil demon fashions apparent flowers made out of paper, then we can discover this and know
it to be illusion. But if the evil demon fashions an illusion that we can never know about, it is
no illusion at all, at least as we use the term. Bouwsma’s version of this idea seems to driven
in large part by ordinary language philosophy—we use the term “illusion” for illusions we can
discover—but the idea can also be motivated through verificationism (claims about illusion require
the possibility of verification) and coherentism (if all our beliefs are coherent, they are correct and
there is no illusion).
I am very much sympathetic with a veridicalist line on skeptical hypotheses, but I do not think
Bouwsma’s argument for this line succeeds. Even in ordinary language, we can make perfect
sense of the idea of an undiscoverable illusion. More generally, I do not think that anti-realist
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views such as idealism, phenomenalism, coherentism, or verificationism provide much reason to
accept a veridicalist line, as I think these views fail for well-known reasons.1
In Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam discusses skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-
in-vat hypothesis using quite different considerations grounded in semantic externalism and the
causal theory of reference. Most of Putnam’s discussion is in support of an incoherentist line on
which I can rule out the hypothesis that I am a brain in a vat (by reductio: if I am a brain in a vat,
externalism entails that my ‘brain’ refers either to nothing or to an external kind such as brains-
in-the-image; so ‘I am a brain in a vat’ is not true; so I am not a brain in a vat). However, one
paragraph in Putnam’s discussion supports a veridicalist line on which brains in vats have mostly
true beliefs.
By what was just said, when the brain in a vat (in the world where every sentient
being is and always was a brain in a vat) thinks ‘There is a tree in front of me’, his
thought does not refer to actual trees. On some theories that we shall discuss it might
refer to trees in the image, or to the electronic impulses that cause tree experiences,
or to the features of the program that are responsible for those electronic impulses.
These theories are not ruled out by what was just said, for there is a close causal
connection between the use of the word ‘tree’ in vat-English and the presence of trees
in the image, the presence of electronic impulses of a certain kind, and the presence
of certain features in the machine’s program. On these theories the brain is right, not
wrong in thinking ‘There is a tree in front of me.’ Given what ‘tree’ refers to in vat-
English and what ‘in front of’ refers to, assuming one of these theories is correct, then
the truth conditions for ‘There is a tree in front of me’ when it occurs in vat-English
1An additional worry is that each of these views threatens to slide into incoherentism rather than veridicalism.
Certainly the first-person evil-demon hypothesis (‘My experiences as of an ordinary world are produced by an evil
demon’) seems meaningless by verificationist lights, because it is unverifiable. It is likewise hard to see how the
hypothesis could be true by phenomenalist and coherentist lights, or by Bouwsma’s own lights, if there is no first-
person evidence for it. There is no analogous problem for a third-person evil-demon situation in which someone else’s
experiences are produced by a third party. We might have good evidence that this scenario obtains. We can then ask
whether the subject’s beliefs are true. It seems that the advocate of these views should say that they are, leading to a sort
of veridicalism about the third-person case. All this tends to lead to the view that our claim ‘They are the victim of an evil
demon’ is true while their claim ‘I am the victim of an evil demon’ is false. In effect, this view is incoherentist about
the first-person case but veridicalist about the third-person case. Putnam’s externalist route to veridicalism also has
something like this consequence, while my structuralist route does not: for most Cartesian hypotheses, it is veridicalist
about both the first-person and the third-person case.
4
are simply that a tree in the image be ‘in front of’ the ‘me’ in question in the image or,
perhaps, that the kind of electronic impulse that normally produces this experience be
coming from the automatic machinery, or, perhaps, that the feature of the machinery
that is supposed to produce the ‘tree in front of one’ experience be operating. And
these truth conditions are certainly fulfilled. (Reason, Truth, and History, p. 14)
Elements of both the coherentist and the externalist line are developed by Donald Davidson in
“A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” (1989). As a coherentist Davidson hold that truth
of a belief consists in coherence with other beliefs, which results in the thesis that it is impossible
for most or all of a subjects’ beliefs to be false. In defending the thesis, Davidson advocates
an externalist variety of interpretivism on which we interpret subject’s beliefs according to their
external cases:
What stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is, in my view, the fact that
we must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects of a
belief to be the causes of that belief. And what we, as interpreters, must take them to
be is what they in fact are. (Davidson 1989, p.)
Davidson does not address global skeptical hypotheses directly, but in expounding Davidson’s
view in “Davidson versus Descartes”, Richard Rorty takes the extra step for him:
That brain too is reacting to features of its environment. But its environment is the
computer’s data bank. The only way you can translate the noises it makes is to cor-
relate them with the bits of data that the computer is feeding in. So the noises that
sounds like ‘It’s Tuesday the 7th of October 2003, and I am eating tofu’ must mean
something like ‘Now I am hooked up to sector 43762 of the hard drive’. For most the
envatted brain’s beliefs, like most of ours, must be true. It is not as easy to delude a
brain as the evil scientist thinks. (Rorty 1993, p.)
I think there is much insight in the Putnam/Davidson veridicalist line on skeptical hypotheses,
but I do not think that standard forms of externalism give compelling reasons to accept veridical-
ism. There are at least two reasons.
First: On standard causal theories of reference, a causal connection between a word and an
item in the world is necessary for reference, but it is not sufficient. For example, ‘phlogiston’ may
be caused by deoxygenization, but it does not refer to deoxygenization; rather, it fails to refer,
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because deoxygenization does not satisfy the complex causal conditions required for reference. It
is natural for a causal theorist with standard Cartesian intuitions to hold that ‘tree’ for a brain in a
vat fails to refer for similar reasons. Externalism and the causal theory alone give little reason to
think otherwise.
Second: The standard arguments for externalism and the causal theory of reference apply
to some words but not to all. Perhaps the central argument is Putnam’s Twin Earth thought-
experiment, which suggests that twins can competently use the term ‘water’ with different refer-
ents. Let us put this by saying that ‘water’ is Twin-Earthable. One can run Twin Earth thought-
experiments for numerous other terms, including ‘tree’, and ‘brain’, but it is much harder to run
them for many other words such as ‘plus’, ‘three’, ‘person’, ‘believe’, ‘see’, ‘object’, ‘philoso-
pher’, or ‘cause’.2 Certainly the standard arguments do not support the claim that these words are
Twin-Earthable, and I think it is more plausible that they are not. For this reason, Putnam’s exter-
nalist argument will not apply to claims cast in non-Twin-Earthable language, such as ‘I can see
three objects’ or ‘I am talking to three philosophers’, and cannot be used to argue that these claims
are true for a brain in a vat. And if claims like these are false in Cartesian scenarios, it seems likely
that other claims in Twin-Earthable language (for example, ‘I can see an apple, a banana, and an
orange’) are false too.
There are stronger versions of externalism to which these objections do not apply. If we accept
a crude causal theory of reference on which a simple causal connection suffices for reference, the
first objection will not apply. If we accept a global externalism on which every use of every word
is Twin-Earthable, the second objection will not apply. But the standard arguments for a causal
theory of reference give little reason to accept a crude causal theory, and the standard arguments
for externalism give little reason to accept global externalism.3 Furthermore, I think there is good
reason to think these views are false. Perhaps a more sophisticated externalist view combined with
further considerations might overcome these objections, but as things stand, the externalist case
for veridicalism seems weak.
3Arguably, every term is subject to Burge-style social externalism. For example, one can construct a Burge-style
Twin Earth case in which two duplicate non-expert subjects use ‘zero’ with deference to their linguistic community,
and in which the two communities use ‘zero’ for zero or for one respectively. Then these twins use ‘zero’ with different
meanings and different referents. However, Burge-style deference does not lead to a veridicalist line on skeptical
scenarios, unless Putnam-style or other considerations have already gotten us there at the level of community use of a
term. Furthermore, it is plausible that Burge-style externalism is not truly global, in that it applies only to certain uses of
these words: roughly, to deferential uses, where a subject defers to the community. It is possible to use terms like ‘zero’
nondeferentially, so that even if one’s community uses the term to refer to 1, one’s own use refers to 0. So in order
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In “The Matrix as Metaphysics” (2003), I develop another veridicalist response to global skep-
ticism, holding that subjects in a computer simulation have mostly true beliefs, as do subjects in
evil-demon scenarios, global dream scenarios, and so on. In that paper I argue that the simulation
hypothesis is equivalent to a certain metaphysical hypothesis, one in which standard physics is
grounded in a deeper level of computational physics. Given the further claim that this metaphys-
ical hypothesis is one in which our beliefs are mostly true, a sort of veridicalism follows. That
argument (which I will call the “matrix argument”) does not take any specific philosophical view
such as structuralism or externalism as a premise. Instead it argues for veridicalism from first-
order considerations about various scenarios. However, certain key ideas in the matrix argument
are structuralist in character. A crucial part of the argument holds, for example, that only structural
considerations matter for a theory in computational physics to be true, so that given that a simula-
tion scenario has the right structure, it will be one in which computational physics (and therefore
standard physics) is correct.
In the remainder of this paper I will develop a structuralist response to global skepticism ex-
plicitly, making explicit a structuralist thesis and showing how it leads to a veridicalist conclusion
that undermines global skepticism.4 This structuralist argument is distinct from the matrix argu-
ment, but the two are complementary. The structuralist argument here in effect explains why the
other argument is effective, if indeed it is, and the matrix argument can be used to support certain
key claims in mounting the structuralist argument.
Preliminaries
Before proceeding, some bookkeeping. In this paper, a hypothesis (such as the Cartesian hypoth-
esis that one is a brain in a vat) can be construed as a sentence, a proposition, or a mental item
such as a thought. A hypothesis is epistemically possible (in the sense relevant here) when it is
not conclusively ruled out a priori. A scenario is a highly specific epistemic possibility, akin to an
epistemically possible world: for example, a certain specific situation in which one’s experiences
for a skeptical hypothesis to be immune to Burge-style externalism, one need only stipulate that subject entertaining
the hypothesis uses the relevant words nondeferentially. In order for the definition of Twin-Earthability in the text to
exclude Burge-style cases, the requirement of competence should be understood as requiring nondeferential usage.
4I develop a related structuralist response to skepticism briefly in Excursus 15 of Constructing the World (Chalmers
2012, pp. 431-40). That response presupposes a good deal of material from earlier in the book and in particular
works within the book’s framework of scrutability. The response in this article is largely independent of the scrutability
framework and is intended to be free-standing.
7
are being produced by an evil demon is an epistemically possible scenario, at least if incoherentism
is false. I will talk of hypotheses being true or false in scenarios. Roughly speaking, a hypothesis
H is true in scenario S iff accepting that we are in S should lead us to accept H (or better, con-
ditionally supposing that we are in S should lead us to conditionally accept H). For example, the
hypothesis that I have hands is true in a certain evil demon scenario if accepting that I am in that
scenario should lead me to accept ‘I have hands’. This is roughly the sort of criterion suggested
by the Ramsey test for evaluating an indicative conditional: if I am in the evil-demon scenario, do
I have hands?
It should be noted that epistemically possible scenarios work somewhat different from meta-
physically possible worlds. For example, it is epistemically possible (at least at the start of inquiry)
that water is XYZ, even though this is not metaphysically possible. There is an epistemically pos-
sible Twin Earth scenario in which the liquid in the oceans and lakes (and so on) is XYZ, and the
hypothesis that water is XYZ is true in that scenario. If we accepted that we were in that scenario,
we should accept ‘Water is XYZ’. Note that all this is quite consistent with the claim that it is
metaphysically impossible that water is XYZ. It is also consistent with the claim that ‘Water is
XYZ’ is false in a metaphysically possible Twin Earth world, and with the counterfactual claim
that if a Twin Earth world obtained, water would be XYZ. The issues in this article are largely
epistemic, not metaphysical.5
Because of this, it can be misleading to think of Cartesian scenarios in counterfactual or third-
personal terms. Veridicalism does not require the counterfactual claim that if I were in a simulation
I would have hands, or the third-person claim that someone being stimulated by evil demons
to have visual experiences as of tables is really seeing a table. The most fundamental issues
here concern first-person epistemic possibilities as above. Most straightforwardly: if I am in a
simulation, do I have hands? Here the simulation hypothesis is considered as a hypothesis about
my own situation, and the conditional is evaluated according to the epistemological Ramsey test
as above.
That said, if one is uncomfortable or unfamiliar with this style of analyzing epistemic possi-
bilities, many of the issues can be cast somewhat more conservatively in metalinguistic terms. For
example, one can ask: if I am in a simulation, is what I express with ‘I have hands’ (in the language
I use in the simulation) true? If I am in a simulation, should I accept ‘I have hands’? One can even
use a metalinguistic counterfactual: if I were in a simulation, would what I express with ‘I have
5See “The Nature of Epistemic Space” for a more rigorous treatment of truth in epistemically possible scenarios.
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hands’ be true? Or one can use a metalinguistic third-person claim: if someone is being stimulated
by an evil demon, are their beliefs (such as the belief they express with ‘I see a table’) true? These
counterfactual and third-person claims are not quite the same as the epistemological claims, but
they are close enough that establishing them would at least do much of the work required for the
veridicalist anti-skeptical strategy.
Another bookkeeping issue: Veridicalist responses to skepticism hold that subjects in Carte-
sian scenarios have mostly true beliefs. An immediate objection may be that for certain Cartesian
hypotheses, veridicalism is ruled out by definition. For example, under the Cartesian hypothesis
that one is entirely deceived by an evil demon, it follows that most or all of one’s beliefs are false.
Under the Cartesian hypothesis that one is a handless brain in a vat, then it follows that one does
not have hands. And so on.
To finesse this issue, I stipulate that Cartesian hypotheses and Cartesian scenarios are specified
in a way that makes no explicit commitment on the veridicality of ordinary beliefs. For example,
the evil-demon hypothesis is the hypothesis that all of our sensory experiences have been produced
by an evil demon, and the brain in a vat hypothesis is the hypothesis that we are brains in vats
receiving inputs from computers. Similarly, evil-demon scenarios will be certain specific scenarios
in which our sensory experiences are produced by an evil demon, and so on. This leaves it a
substantive issue whether our beliefs are true in these scenarios. The skeptic typically finds it
obvious that even in these neutrally specified scenarios, our beliefs are false, but the veridicalist
thinks that in these scenarios, most of our beliefs are true. As for the hypothesis that one is entirely
deceived by an evil demon, and other non-neutral hypotheses: a veridicalist is likely to say that
these hypotheses are incoherent, or least that they are not vindicated by the scenarios that one
normally has in mind in considering the hypotheses. I will return to those hypotheses later.
Structuralism
Structuralism about a domain says roughly that all claims (or all truths) about those domains are
equivalent to structural claims. I will focus on structuralism about the physical, in a version that
says all physical claims are equivalent to structural claims. Four notions need explication: claim,
physical, equivalent, structural.
What is a claim? In principle a claim (like a hypothesis, above) can be an assertive sentence, a
proposition, or a thought. Ideally one would do things in terms of propositions, but controversies
about the individuation of propositions (whether they are Russellian or Fregean, for example) tend
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to confuse important issues here. For present purposes we can focus initially on sentences (or
to avoid worries about context-dependence, utterances of sentences or sentences in contexts), for
which the issues are clearest and most concrete.
What is a physical claim? This is a claim about physical objects using ordinary physical
vocabulary: roughly the vocabulary of space (location, shape, size, and so on), time (including
motion and so on), and mass, plus logical and mathematical expressions. We could also allow a
more theoretical physical vocabulary to be used here, but this will not make much difference for
the purposes of the argument.
What is equivalence? For present purposes this can be understood as a priori equivalence: A
and B are equivalent when “A iff B” is knowable a priori. For our purposes we could also un-
derstand it as a conceptual equivalence, or semantic equivalence or truth-conditional equivalence,
as long as these relations are epistemologically constrained (roughly so that when two claims are
equivalent, we can know a priori that they are equivalent).
What is a structural claim? For present purposes this can be understood as a claim using only
logical and mathematical expressions and a limited vocabulary of auxiliary structural expressions
(to be characterized shortly), perhaps along with phenomenal expressions (to capture the role of
observation).
The structuralist thesis here is closely related to structural realism in the philosophy of sci-
ence. Standardly, structural realism is understood as a claim about scientific theories, including
especially physical theories, holding that roughly that those theories are equivalent to structural
theories. Epistemological structural realism says roughly that all knowable scientific truths are
equivalent to structural truths, while ontological structural realism says that the reality that sci-
entific theories describe is wholly structural. We can also formulate domain-relative versions of
epistemological and ontological structural realism, where the truths and theories in question are
restricted to specific domains such as the physical domain.
The version of structural realism that is most relevant for my purposes is a close relative of
these two. What we might call conceptual structural realism holds that scientific theories are
equivalent to structural theories, and that scientific claims are equivalent to structural claims. Con-
ceptual structural realism is not the same as epistemological or ontological structural realism,
since it does not make claims about knowledge or ontology. It entails epistemological structural
realism, but not vice versa: the two views may come apart if some scientific claims are nonstruc-
tural but unknowable. It does not entail ontological structural realism, or vice versa: conceptual
structural realism is consistent with there being nonstructural properties in reality (for example, a
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nonstructural mass property that plays the structural mass role).
Conceptual structural realism has been a central form of scientific structuralism throughout
the 20th century. Certainly versions of it were advocated by Russell, Carnap, and Lewis in their
cases for structuralism. It is also conceptual structural realism that falls most naturally out of the
Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method for regimenting scientific theories into Ramsey sentences.6
The Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method is a method for eliminating theoretical terms from a theory,
moving from a statement of the theory that uses a theoretical term to an equivalent statement
without it. The basic idea is that one starts with a complete statement T of a theory, including
both principles that connect theoretical notions to each other and principles connecting them to
observation. For any given theoretical term that occurs in this statement (‘charge’, say), one
can represent this theory as saying T ′(charge), where T ′ is a complex one-place predicate. The
corresponding Ramsey sentence is then ∃φT ′(φ). Advocates of the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method
typically hold that the original theory T , using the word ‘charge’, is equivalent to the Ramsified
theory ∃φT ′(φ) that does not use the word.
If we repeat this process for every theoretical term in a theory, we are left with a Ramsey
sentence R that uses only non-theoretical expressions. For example, if the original theory T says
T ∗(mass, charge, space, time), the Ramsified theory R will say ∃φ∃ψ∃µ∃νT ∗(φ, ψ, µ, ν). The
non-theoretical expressions left in R are usually construed to include logical and mathematical
expressions and perhaps certain auxiliary structural expressions (to be discussed shortly), as well
as observational expressions. The standard claim is that the Ramsey sentence R encapsulates the
content of the original theory T , so that R and T are conceptually equivalent.
What undergirds this conceptual equivalence is the idea that theoretical terms such as ‘charge’
get their entire meaning from the role they play within the theory. In effect, ‘charge’ just means
‘the property that plays the charge role’, where the charge role is specified by the theory. On one
very simple view, the charge role is given by the entire theory, so that ‘charge’ is conceptually
equivalent to ‘the property φ such that T (φ)’. This view is almost certainly false, since it is usually
the case that some parts of a theory can turn out to be false without us saying that charge (or
another theoretical entity) does not exist. More plausible is that there is some subset C of the
theory (perhaps a weighted set of principles) that encapsulates the “core” charge role, such that
‘charge’ is conceptually equivalent to ‘the property φ such that C′(φ) (where C′ is a one-place
predicate encapsulating what C says about charge). Then the theory T as a whole, which says
6See Carnap 1927; Lewis 1972; Ramsey 1931; Russell 1927.
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T ′(charge), is equivalent to ∃φ(C′(φ)&T ′(φ)). This is in turn equivalent to ∃φT ′(φ), given that
T ′(φ) entails C′(φ) (because C is a subset of T ).
In moving from theoretical terms to ordinary physical terms, a complication is that many key
scientific notions, such as ‘mass’, occur in more than one theory, so their content is not plausibly
given by their role within a single theory. In these cases one can usually stipulate a technical
notion (‘gravitational mass’, for example) tied to a single theory, but for the broader notion that
occurs across theories, then a core associated role may well involve elements of multiple theo-
ries. Furthermore, many of these notions occur prescientifically, in which case a full accounting
of the associated role for everyday physical concepts may include elements of folk physics, in-
cluding connections to observation. Still, it remains plausible that ‘mass’ can be understood as
‘the property that plays the mass role’, where the mass role may involve multiple theories and also
connections to observation.
Given this equivalence for arbitrary physical terms such as ‘mass’, ‘space, and ‘time’, we have
the resources to translate not just physical theories but arbitrary physical sentences into structural
sentences. Take a physical sentence such as ‘There is an object with mass two kilograms three
meters from me’. To translate the sentence, we need only Ramsify the physical expressions in-
cluded. Mass can be represented as mass-in-kilograms, a function from objects to numbers, which
can then be Ramsified as something like ‘the function φ such that R1(φ)’. Likewise distance can
be represented as distance in meters, a function from pairs of objects to numbers, which can be
Ramsified as something like ‘the function ψ such that R2(ψ)’. Applying these equivalences to
the original sentence yields something like: ∃x∃φ∃ψ(R1(φ)&R2(ψ)&(φ(x) = 2)&(ψ(x,me) = 3)).
The result will be a structural sentence as before.
What expressions will be left in these structural sentences, after theoretical expressions are
eliminated? One class of expressions left in are observational expressions. On some views these
will include expressions for externally observed qualities such as colors, shapes, and the like.
However, we can use the Ramsey method to eliminate these expressions in favor of phenomenal
expressions (concerning conscious experiences) and possibly indexical expressions, for example
replacing ‘red’ by something like ‘the property that normally causes red experiences in me’ (or
perhaps ‘in my community’). I will discuss this move further later in the paper (where the applica-
tion to space in particular raises some crucial issues), but for now I will assume that phenomenal
and indexical expressions are all the observational expressions that we need in structural sentences.
Observational expressions aside, what other non-Ramsified terms will be left in a structure
sentence? The early structuralists (Carnap and Russell) hoped that these might include only logical
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and mathematical expressions. Around 1927 the mathematician Max Newman as well as Carnap
himself independently noted that structure sentences like this are too weak to capture the content
of our scientific theories: they are satisfied by any world of the right cardinality (and with the right
phenomenal states, if phenomenal expressions are included). To remove Newman’s problem, one
needs to include additional expressions. One popular addition is expressions constraining the
classes of properties involved, such as ‘natural’ or ‘fundamental’, capturing the idea that theories
should involve relatively natural properties rather than wildly disjunctive properties (which play a
key role in Newman’s demonstration). Another popular addition is nomic and causal expressions
such as ‘law’ and ‘cause’, capturing the idea that theories are not just capturing mathematical
structure but nomic and causal structure. For now I will adopt a view on which expressions of
both sorts can be included, perhaps along with mereological notions such as ‘part’ and categorical
notions such as ‘object’, and ‘property.7
Under these constraints, a typical Ramsey sentence for a physical theory may take the form:
“There exist natural properties and relations such that these properties and relations stand in such-
and-such nomic/causal relations to each other and to experience”. A typical structure sentence for
a physical sentence will involve both a Ramsey-like part like this along with a part specifying a
particular distribution of the properties and relations in question, along the lines given for ‘There
is an object with mass two kilograms three meters from me’ above.
In this way, application of the Ramsey method supports conceptual structuralism about the
physical. Of course like every philosophical thesis, this thesis is not uncontroversial. Perhaps
the most controversial step involves the existence of a core role associated with physical notions
such that it is a priori or analytic that (for example) mass is whatever plays the mass role. This
involves a sort of descriptivism about physical terms that some will dispute. It is possible to
develop a structuralist response to skepticism without this descriptivist version of structuralism,8
but to avoid complications I will stay with the simpler version here. There is also an important
question about whether every physical notion, including space and time, can be eliminated via the
Ramsey method.
It should be noted that conceptual structuralism about the physical does not entail a metaphys-
7The problem for logical structuralism is pointed out by Carnap 1927 and Newman 1928. Carnap invokes natu-
ralness to solve the problem, as does Lewis (1984). For discussion of just what it is to be structural, and of which
expressions should not be Ramsified away, see Chalmers (2012, pp. 362-5 and 409-22.)
8See Constructing the World (excursus 15), in which a non-descriptivist version of the response is developed using
the scrutability framework.
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ical structuralism on which all physical properties are identical to structural properties (roughly,
the property of playing a certain role, or of being disposed to play that role, or of having a property
that plays that role). The view I have set out here identifies physical properties with those that play
a certain structural role. These properties may themselves be fine-grained structural properties, or
nonstructural properties. They might even be hidden “quiddities”. There are also versions of con-
ceptual structuralism where physical properties are defined as structural properties: for example,
where ‘mass’ is defined as a disposition or a power to resist acceleration. I discuss all this in more
depth in the section on realizer structuralism and role structuralism.9
A terminological point: structural realism is usually understood as a claim about scientific the-
ories, whereas the claim that ordinary physical concepts such as ‘mass’ and ‘space’ are structural
is not exactly a claim about theories. I will speak of it more generally as a form of structuralism
about the physical domain. This term also has the advantage that it may seem question-begging
to assume structural realism in arguing against a skeptic who questions realism about the phys-
ical world. In fact, the conceptual structural realism discussed here is realist about the content
of scientific theories (these make a substantive claim about the world beyond appearances) but
not about their truth. Structuralism about physical concepts is realist about content in a similar
way. Realism about content does not beg any questions against the skeptic, and in fact tends to
be more congenial to skeptical arguments than anti-realism about content. But calling the thesis
“structuralism” rather than “structural realism” will help avoid confusion on this score.
The Structuralist Argument Against Global Skepticism
We are now in a position to mount a structuralist argument for veridicalism.
Let us say that a non-Cartesian scenario is one in which experiences are not produced by
dreams, simulations, or other models of an environment. It is plausible that for every non-Cartesian
scenario, there are various corresponding Cartesian scenarios, in which the same experiences are
had by the subject at the center of the scenario but in which that subject’s environment involves a
model of the non-Cartesian scenario.10 There is a simulation scenario in which the non-Cartesian
scenario is perfectly simulated; there is a demon scenario in which the demon keeps track of all
elements of the non-Cartesian scenario; there is a dream scenario in which the dream involves a
9For metaphysical structuralism where physical properties are identical to structural properties, see (for example)
Hawthorne 2002 and Shoemaker 1980. For an epistemological structuralism involving hidden quiddities, see (for
example) Langton 1998 and Lewis 2009.
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complete model of the non-Cartesian scenario; and so on.
It is not obvious that for every Cartesian scenario, there is a corresponding non-Cartesian sce-
nario. But plausibly this is the case for those Cartesian scenarios that involve a complete model of
a non-Cartesian scenario as above. I will call these full-scale Cartesian scenarios. For example,
for a non-Cartesian scenario reflecting the universe as we normally think of it, there is a corre-
sponding full-scale simulation scenario in which physics throughout the universe is simulated,
and similarly for full-scale demon and dream scenarios.
I will start with an argument that applies to full-scale Cartesian scenarios. In the next section
I will generalize to other Cartesian scenarios.
(1) All physical claims P are equivalent to structural claims S(P).
(2) For all positive physical claims P, if S(P) is true in a non-Cartesian scenario, it is
true in any corresponding Cartesian scenario.
—
(3) For all positive physical claims P, if P is true in a non-Cartesian scenario, it is true
in any corresponding Cartesian scenario.
Premise 1 is a statement of the structuralist thesis from the previous section. Premise 2 is the
other key premise. Here the idea is roughly that all the structure present in an ordinary scenario is
present in a corresponding Cartesian scenario. The physical claims are restricted to positive claims
in order to accommodate the fact that Cartesian scenarios may involve extra structure not present
in the original non-Cartesian scenario. Given the additional background premise that equivalent
claims are true in the same scenarios, the conclusion follows. The conclusion suggests that veridi-
calism is true for full-scale Cartesian scenarios, at least given that it is true for corresponding
non-Cartesian scenarios. For example, as long as most of our beliefs are true in the physical world
as we ordinarily conceive of it, they will be true in a corresponding Cartesian scenario. If this is
right, full-scale Cartesian scenarios do no work to support global skepticism, and their epistemic
possibility does not undercut our knowledge of the external world.
10In assuming that Cartesian scenarios are epistemically possible (not ruled out a priori), I here assume the falsity of
incoherentism. In assuming that Cartesian and non-Cartesian scenarios can involve the same experiences, I assume the
falsity of certain forms of phenomenal externalism, on which experiences constitutively depend on the environment (by
principles that are knowable a priori). These forms of phenomenal externalism might be developed into a distinctive
incoherentist response to skepticism; see McDowell 2008 and Peacocke 2014 for discussion.
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Admittedly the conclusion concerns only positive physical claims and not external-world
claims in general, but even this limited conclusion is enough to undercut the argument for global
skepticism. There is a genuine skeptical issue about knowledge of negative claims (how can we
know that there is not more to the world than what we find here?), but this goes beyond standard
external-world skepticism and at best leads to partial skepticism, not global skepticism. Setting
these aside, it is easy enough to generalize from positive physical claims to positive external-world
claims more generally. In Cartesian scenarios, the main reasons for doubting an external-world
claim such as ‘There’s a tree in front of me’ are also reasons for doubting physical claims such as
‘There’s an object of a certain size and shape in front of me’. Once reasons for doubting physical
claims have been defeated, there remains little reason to doubt other external-world claims. One
could also give a more comprehensive version of the argument applying to any positive external-
world claims grounded in structuralism about all or most external-world notions, but this goes
beyond what is needed to defeat global skepticism.
It remains to defend premise 2: for all positive physical claims P, if S(P) is true in a non-
Cartesian scenario, it is true in a corresponding Cartesian scenario. The central idea is that the
positive causal structure in a non-Cartesian scenario is also present in a corresponding Cartesian
scenario, so that the positive structure sentences true in the former are true in the latter.11
It is easiest to see this in the case of a simulation scenario. Simulations work by replicating
the causal structure of a system in detail.12 For every physical object in the actual world, there
will be a corresponding virtual object in the simulation scenario. Virtual objects are real objects
realized within computer processes: roughly, they are data structures or entities constituted by
data structures. For every physical property of physical objects in the actual world, there will be a
corresponding virtual property of virtual objects in the simulation: this will be a property of data
structures, such as a value in a data array. If two properties have a systematic causal connection ty-
ing them together in the actual world, the corresponding virtual properties will have a systematic
causal structure in the simulation. Furthermore, because we have stipulated that Cartesian sce-
narios should be experientially identical to ordinary scenarios, where a physical property brings
11Sklar (1985, pp. 60-61) and Vogel (1990, p. 661) both make the point that full-scale Cartesian hypotheses are
structurally isomorphic to non-Cartesian hypotheses. Vogel suggests that under a “computer skeptical hypothesis”,
portions of a computer disk and certain data properties could stand in the same pattern of causal relations as objects
and properties in the real world, although he rejects the claim that this structural isomorphism yields equivalence in a
stronger sense (see Vogel forthcoming). Sklar (p. 60) notes that in principle a structuralist about theoretical equivalence
could “bite the bullet” and use this structural isomorphism to argue that certain Cartesian and non-Cartesian hypotheses
are equivalent.
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about experiences in our world, the corresponding virtual property will bring about the same sort
of experiences in the simulation.
This structural similarity gives good initial reason to think that the relevant structure sentences
satisfied in the ordinary scenario are also satisfied in a corresponding simulation scenario. The
Ramsey sentence for physical properties requires mainly causal structure: that there exist prop-
erties and relations that stand in certain nomic/causal relations to each other and experience. For
the reasons above, it is plausible that if this structure is present in a non-Cartesian scenario, it
is present in a corresponding simulation scenario. Furthermore, given that the Ramsey sentence
for the physical is satisfied in the simulation, it is just a small step to the satisfaction of specific
structure sentences corresponding to specific positive physical claims, such as ‘There is an object
with mass two kilograms three meters from me’. These specific structure sentences will conjoin
the Ramsey sentence, or enough of it to say that there are properties φ and ψ playing the mass
role and the distance role, with a claim about how those properties are instantiated. If the original
claim is true in the actual world, and the simulation is accurate, there will certainly be a virtual
object with the right virtual properties (for example, standing in a virtual distance of three meters
from my virtual body) to satisfy that claim.
What goes for a simulation scenario also goes for other full-scale Cartesian scenarios. If
the brain-in-vat scenario involves a computer, as it is usually held to, then the discussion of the
simulation scenario applies directly. As for the evil-demon scenario: supposing the demon is
modeling classical physics, then for every classical particle there will presumably be some sort of
representation in the demon’s mind, and these representations will interact very much as virtual
objects interact in the simulation scenario. Something similar goes for the dream scenario, except
here the representations will be in part of one’s own mind. In both cases, these representations and
their properties will have causal structure that enables the relevant Ramsey sentence to be satisfied.
This makes an initial case for premise 2. There are a number of immediate possible objections.
Perhaps the most important objections are tied to the fact that the non-Cartesian scenarios are not
completely structurally isomorphic to the original scenario, so that not all of the same structural
sentences are true there.13 We can illustrate with the case of simulation scenarios.
12See “On Implementing a Computation” (1994) for an analysis on which implementing a computation requires a
system to have appropriate causal structure, and “The Virtual and the Real” (2017) for a discussion of the metaphysics
of virtual objects.
13A version of this strategy is suggested by the discussion in Vogel (forthcoming). Vogel argues that there are
important structural differences involving fundamentality, modality, and causation (including differences on the lines
of (i)-(iii) below) between space in non-Cartesian scenarios and its counterparts in simulation scenarios, and likewise
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Some potential structural differences between non-Cartesian scenarios and simulation scenar-
ios include: (i) the virtual properties involved in the simulation scenario are somewhat less funda-
mental and less natural than their counterparts in the original scenario; (ii) these virtual properties
are not connected by iron-clad laws of nature; (iii) causal connections among virtual objects and
properties are heavily mediated, for example by a central processing unit; (iv) more generally, the
simulation will have a great deal of extra fine-grained causal structure, for example in the pro-
cesses that realize the simulation; (v) the simulation is presumably embedded in a broader world
which contains much additional structure; (vi) all this is designed by someone who might change
or shut down the simulation at any time.
These observations are all correct, and they entail that not every sentence in a structural vo-
cabulary that is true in a non-Cartesian scenario is true in a Cartesian scenario. However, I do not
think they undermine premise 2. An initial observation is that many of them (especially (iii)-(vi))
involve extra structure that is present in the Cartesian but not the non-Cartesian scenario. In cases
like this, it is arguable that any positive structure sentence that is true in the non-Cartesian scenario
will also be true in the Cartesian scenario. If so, and if positive physical sentences are all equivalent
to positive structure sentences, then cases like (iii)-(vi) do not pose a threat to premise 2. There
remains a threat from cases (i) and (ii), however, insofar as it is arguable that positive structure
statements about fundamentality and laws of nature can be true in non-Cartesian scenarios but not
the corresponding Cartesian scenarios.
The key cases here include structural claims such as “a fundamental property plays the mass
role”, “the properties playing the mass role and the distance role are connected by an iron-clad
law”, and “other subjects have experiences”. These plausibly can be true in a non-Cartesian sce-
nario without being true in the corresponding non-Cartesian scenario. If structural claims like
these are involved in structure sentences associated with ordinary positive physical claims (for
example, if ‘mass’ was equivalent to ‘that fundamental property that plays the mass role’), then
ordinary physical claims would also be false in a simulation scenario. However, I will argue that
these structural claims play no role in the structure sentences associated with ordinary physical
claims, so they do not threaten the truth of these physical claims in simulation scenarios.
To make this case, we need only consider non-Cartesian scenarios in which the relevant con-
straints are violated. I will focus on constraints involving mass, the what I say applies equally to
space and other crucial physical properties. For example, we could certainly discover that mass
between material objects in non-Cartesian scenarios and their counterparts in simulation scenarios.
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is not fundamental and is instead a derivative property. This suggests that fundamentality is not
required for there to be mass in a scenario, and that fundamentality is not part of the structure
sentence associated with mass. Similarly, we could discover that current laws such as laws of
gravitation are not iron-clad but apply only in certain special circumstances that our cosmos hap-
pens to be in. In fact, something like this applies to all the cases (i)-(vi). We could discover that
what we thought were simple causal connections in our world are mediated. We could discover
that there are a number of levels of physical structure, with enormous causal complexity, below
the level of mass. We could discover that our universe is embedded in a much broader cosmos
containing many such universes. We could discover that there is a god who created the physical
world and who sustains the laws of nature and mediates all causal connections. None of these
things would lead us to say that there is no mass. In fact, for every structural constraint violated in
the simulation scenario, it is easy to come up with a non-Cartesian scenario in which the same con-
straints are violated, and in which there is still mass. The same goes for space and other physical
properties.
All this suggests that these structural constraints do not play an essential role in the application
of physical terms or in the truth of ordinary physical claims about the world. So they are no
obstacle to the truth of ordinary physical claims in a simulation scenario. Of course some highly
theoretical claims, for example involving fundamentality and iron-clad laws, may be true in an
ordinary scenario and false in a Cartesian scenario. If so, structuralism alone does not rebut a
Cartesian skeptical challenge to our knowledge of these theoretical claims. But these claims are
not ordinary physical claims; and even if they were, the objection would threaten only a small
subset of physical claims, not physical claims generally.
A related issue involves possible structural differences involving the roles of minds in these
scenarios. We have allowed that structure sentences can include claims about connections to ex-
periences. But some Cartesian scenarios differ from corresponding non-Cartesian scenarios. For
example, we have stipulated that a Cartesian scenario should involve the same stream of expe-
riences for a subject at the center of the scenario, but experiences in others may be different or
absent. For example, there is no guarantee that a simulation scenario will replicate the experiences
of others; at least, this would require the truth of certain functionalist theses about the mind, which
it would seem odd to assume here. I think we can respond to this sort of worry as with those
above, however. The existence of other minds is not required for our ordinary physical claims to
be true. Even if it turned out that everyone else was a zombie, my claims about the existence of a
square object in front of me could still be true. So this potential difference between Cartesian and
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non-Cartesian scenarios does not threaten the truth of ordinary physical claims.
A deeper issue about the mind arises from the demon and dream scenarios. In these cases,
it seems that entities in the subject’s environment will be mind-dependent: in one case they de-
pend on the mind of the demon, and in the other case on the mind of the dreamer. Since mind-
independence of the external world is often used as a criterion for realism, this mind-dependence
may limit the sorts of realism that is true if we are in these scenarios. Some may even think that
mind-dependence of this sort will entail that ordinary physical claims are not true.
While mind-independence may be a criterion for certain sorts of realism, I do not think it
is a criterion for the truth of physical claims. For example, it could turn out that a certain sort
of panpsychism is true, on which fundamental physics is realized at the microphysical level by
conscious subjects with phenomenal properties interacting according to the structure and dynamics
of physics. On this view, there would still be physical entities such as electrons— they would just
be realized mentally. It could even turn out that a certain sort of cosmopsychism is true, and the
physics of the universe as a whole is realized by the structure and dynamics within a single mind.
Again, there would still be physical entities on this view, even though they are mentally realized.
The demon and dream scenarios are structurally analogous: in these scenarios, physical entities
really exist, playing the roles they are supposed to play; it is just that these entities turn out to
be mental. So the possibility of these scenarios does not threaten knowledge of ordinary physical
claims; at most, they threaten knowledge of more theoretical claims, such as the claim that the
physical world exists mind-independently.
Extending the argument to other Cartesian scenarios
We have so far considered full-scale Cartesian scenarios: those that involve some sort of complete
model of a universe. Not all Cartesian scenarios are full-scale Cartesian scenarios. There are also
limited Cartesian scenarios, in which only part of the universe is modeled in detail (just a single
room, say, or just the solar system), or in which it is modeled only at a limited macroscopic scale.
There may also be Cartesian scenarios with no model at all: for example, those in which the stream
of experiences develops as it does through random coincidence. What should we say about these
scenarios?
Limited Cartesian scenarios require fewer resources to construct than full-scale scenarios, but
they are also likely to be imperfect. With a limited model, it will be difficult to properly model
interactions with parts of the universe not included in the model. For example, what happens if
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someone in the room or the solar system carefully observes the world outside, or attempts to travel
there? What if the beings in a macroscopic simulation perform repeated scientific observations
on the microscopic level? Perhaps there may be ways to do this in an approximate way and to
construct more detailed models when needed, but it will be highly nontrivial to do so in a way that
yields a fully convincing and coherent stream of experiences. Still, I will set aside these worries
and address the status of limited Cartesian scenarios, focusing on the case of a simulation.
One sort of limited Cartesian scenario is a local simulation, in which only part of the world
is modeled in detail, and in which the rest is modeled much more coarsely. This case is broadly
analogous to a physical scenario in which only the solar system exists and in which observations
of the universe beyond are grounded in a coarse-grained simulation. In this case, we would almost
certainly say that ordinary physical claims about our environment on Earth are true (there is a
computer on my desk, and so on), although various other things we believe, for example about
other stars and galaxies, may be false. This suggests that the core structural role associated with
physical terms need only apply locally, not globally. If this is right, then in a local simulation, the
Ramsey sentence for our physical terms will still be satisfied, and most ordinary physical claims
(except those about the distant universe) will be true.
Another sort of limited Cartesian scenario is a macroscopic simulation, in which only macro-
scopic physical processes are simulated in detail, and microscopic processes will be simulated
just well enough to account for certain macroscopic effects. This case is broadly analogous to
a physical scenario in which macroscopic objects really exist but in which microscopic objects
may not. In this case, we would still allow that there are physical objects around us, and that
for example there is an object with a certain mass a certain distance in front of me. At the same
time, we might well deny the existence of microscopic objects and microphysical processes, as
well as denying various laws that govern the microphysical level (which turn out only to be instru-
mentally valid). We would say that objects still have mass and perhaps charge, but perhaps not
microphysics-specific properties such as spin. This suggests that for the application of ordinary
physical terms such as ‘mass’ and ‘distance’, fine-grained microphysical theories involving these
terms do not play an essential role, with macrophysical principles and connections to experience
playing a more central role. If the same applies in a high-level simulation, these terms will pick
our virtual properties that play these high-level roles, and most ordinary physical claims at the
macroscopic level will remain true.
We can also combine the two sorts of scenarios, yielding a local and macroscopic scenario.
In this case many claims about the faraway and the very small may be false, but claims about
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one’s immediate physical environment still seem likely to be true, undercutting global skepticism.
All this applies equally to other styles of Cartesian scenarios, including local and/or macroscopic
versions of the dream and demon hypotheses. So none of these support global skepticism.
Another relevant class of scenarios include those where one is currently dreaming, or where
one has recently entered a simulation, or when an evil demon took over one’s stream of experiences
only in the recent past. On the most natural versions of these scenarios, one’s previous life was
normal, with experiences not generated by dreams, demons, or simulations. In these cases, some
of one’s current beliefs based on perception and short-term memory may be false, but one will at
least have correct memories of the past (that one was born in a certain location, say) and many
correct standing beliefs (that Paris is in France, say). In another version of the case, one was
only recently created, with all one’s memories in place. In that case, some sort of model will
be required to create one’s beliefs and one’s memories, and the model will have the same sort of
structure present in other Cartesian models, so I am inclined to think that many of one’s beliefs
will be true in virtue of the model. Either way, many of one’s beliefs will be true, and global
skepticism does not threaten.
One can devise disjunctive scenarios in which one’s experiences have many sorts of cause—
perhaps a demon one day, a dream the next day, a simulation the next day, and so on. If one sort
of cause is dominant here, then perhaps as in the recent envatment case, one’s beliefs grounded
in the dominant source will be true, and the others false. If no sort of cause is dominant, then
one can ask what explains the great similarity between the different causes, so that they generate a
highly regular stream of experiences. Perhaps the most natural explanation is that there is a single
model generating all of these specific causes (a master model used by the demon, the dream, and
so on). If so, then the relevant structure can be found in that model, and it will plausibly make
one’s beliefs about the word mostly correct.
Something similar to this applies to any scenario in which there is a systematic explanation
of the regularities in our experience. As long as there is some reasonable explanation, there must
be relevant structure in the environment. Then much of the structure required for the truth of our
physical beliefs will be present, and many of those beliefs will be true. So no such scenario will
be a global skeptical scenario.
What is there is no good explanation of the regularities in our experience? For example, what
if there is random physical stimulation that just happens to produce our highly coherent stream
of consciousness? As an extreme case, what if there is no external world at all, and just random
dynamics for experience, which by complete coincidence yields a regular stream of experience?
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I think we should concede that these no-explanation scenarios are scenarios in which one’s
ordinary physical beliefs are false. These beliefs require some structure in the environment and
some normal causes of our experiences, but in this case there is no such structure and no such
normal causes. So veridicalism does not apply to these scenarios. Instead, I think that these
scenarios can be ruled out by inference to the best explanation. Precisely because these scenarios
have no good explanation of our experiences, and many better explanations are available, they can
be ruled out by abduction.14
Abductive replies to Cartesian skepticism are already familiar from Russell and others, who
argue that demon hypotheses, dream hypotheses, and other hypotheses give less good explanations
of the regularities in our experiences than non-Cartesian hypotheses. One recurrent problem is that
it is far from clear that these explanations are so much worse; the simulation explanation especially
can seem quite good. The current use of abduction requires a far weaker use of the principle, to
rule out extreme cases in which no systematic explanation is available.
In effect, structuralism and abductivism combine to deal with Cartesian skepticism. Explana-
tory scenarios—those in which there is some explanation of one’s experiences—are handled by
structuralism, which yields a veridicalist line on these scenarios. Non-explanatory scenarios—
those in which there is no explanation of the regularities in our experience—are handled by ab-
ductivism, which allows us to exclude these scenarios. We can sum things up in an argument as
follows:
(1) In explanatory Cartesian scenarios, many of our physical beliefs are true.
(2) Non-explanatory Cartesian scenarios are ruled out by abduction.
–
(3) All Cartesian scenarios are either ruled out by abduction or are scenarios where
most of our physical beliefs are true.
14What about Boltzmann brains? These are cases where one’s brain is assembled randomly, so there is no good
explanation except randomness for one’s experience. Certain physical theories predict that in an infinite universe,
Boltzmann brains just like mine will appear an infinite number of times. If so, one might suggest that abduction does not
rule out the Boltzmann brain hypothesis, but may even support it: at least, abduction from our experience may support
a physical theory which supports the Boltzmann brain hypothesis. In response, I think that the chain of reasoning that
assigns the Boltzmann brain high probability should be rejected, not least because this assignment is unstable (if we are
Boltzmann brains our inferences to physical theories cannot be trusted). More generally, in Boltzmann brain universes
the vast majority of experiencers will have irregular experiences, so the fact that we have regular experiences tends to
disconfirm the Boltzmann brain hypothesis and any theory that supports it.
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In this way structuralism and abductivism can come together to yield a comprehensive re-
sponse to global skepticism.
Role Structuralism and Realizer Structuralism
It may be objected that the argument collapses the distinction between simulation and reality. For
example, in reality the Empire State Building has a mass of 331 million kilograms. In principle we
could build a perfect computational simulation of the Empire State Building, but the simulation
need not have a mass of 331 million kilograms. It might be implemented in computer circuitry
weighing only a few grams. It is not entirely clear what if any mass properties the virtual objects
involved in the simulation have, but it seems clear than none of them has mass of hundreds of
millions of kilograms. But by the arguments in the previous section, the simulation will have
all the relevant structural properties of reality, and a virtual object will have the same relevant
structural properties as the Empire State Building. So something must have gone wrong: either
mass is not a structural property, or structural properties are not duplicated in simulations.
In response, we have already seen that conceptual structuralism about the physical is not com-
mitted to the claim that physical properties are structural properties. The Ramsey method as
developed above identifies physical properties such as mass as the properties that play a certain
structural role. On this approach, mass is not itself the structural property of playing that role, or
of having a property of playing that role. Rather, it is the realizer of the role: the property that in
fact plays that role. The realizer property will typically be entirely distinct from the role property.
In some cases the realizer property may be a distinct structural property, while in other cases it
may be a nonstructural property: the structuralism I have developed is consistent with both pos-
sibilities. But either way, we cannot infer from sameness of role property to sameness of realizer
property.
The role/realizer distinction enables us to defuse the objection. When we say a simulation has
the same structure as a non-simulation, we are saying the two have the same structural role prop-
erties. For example, where mass is concerned, both will instantiate the higher-order role property
of having a realizer property that plays the mass role, where this role is specified structurally. But
the simulation and the non-simulation will not have the same realizer properties. In a simulation,
the realizer property for mass will be some sort of complex computational property. In a non-
simulation, the realizer property for mass will be a noncomputational physical property (at least
assuming physics is not computational).
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On this approach, mass will be identified as the property that plays the mass role in our situa-
tion in the actual world. If we are not in a simulation or a world with computational physics, the
property of having a mass of 331 million kg will be a noncomputational property. If we build a
perfect simulation of the Empire State Building with a virtual object corresponding to the build-
ing, the virtual object will not have this noncomputational property, so it will not have mass 331
million kg. It will have a different computational property that plays the role in the simulation, a
property we might call virtual mass. But virtual mass will be quite different from mass.
On the other hand, if we are in fact in a simulation, then the property that plays the mass role
will itself be a computational property, so it will be correct to say that mass is a computational
property. More generally, we can say that in the simulation scenario (considered as an epistemic
possibility), mass is a computational property. This is because in any scenario, ‘mass’ picks out
whatever plays the mass role in that scenario.
All this is analogous to what goes on with a term such as ‘heat’, which we can think of as
picking out whatever plays the heat role (which involves causing certain sensations in us). As it
happens, the motion of molecules plays the heat role. But it could have turned out that something
else, say PQR, played the heat role. If we are in fact in a scenario where PQR plays the heat role,
then it will be correct to say that heat is PQR. So in the PQR scenario, heat is PQR. But given that
we are actually in a situation in which molecular motion plays the heat role, heat is the motion of
molecules. As Kripke put things, it is a priori that heat is whatever plays the heat role, and given
that molecular motion plays the heat role, it is necessary that heat is molecular motion. In the
current framework, it is a priori that mass plays the mass role, and given that a certain property
plays that role, it is necessary that mass is that property.
This phenomenon gives rise to a certain sort of Necker-cube phenomenon in thinking about
skeptical scenarios. When we think about the building simulation scenario as a distant part of our
world, or as a counterfactual possible world, we describe it as one in which mass is a nonvirtual
property and in which nothing weighs 331 million tons. On the other hand, when we think of
it as an epistemic possibility concerning the situation we may actually be in, we describe it as a
scenario in which mass is a virtual property and in which the building ways 331 million tons. This
is again analogous to the Kripkean cases: if we consider Putnam’s Twin Earth as a distant part of
our world, or a counterfactual metaphysically possible world, we describe it as one in which water
is still H2O and the lakes do not contain water. But if we consider it as an epistemic possibility
concerning the situation we may actually be in (it may turn out that the lakes contain XYZ), we
describe it as a scenario in which water is XYZ and the lakes contain water. After all, if we accept
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that we have been on Twin Earth all along, we should accept that water is XYZ. Likewise, if we
accept that we have been in a simulation all along, we should accept that mass is a virtual property.
One subtlety concerns what goes on if there are multiple properties playing the same structural
role in the actual world. For example, if we are in a nonsimulated world that also contains simu-
lations, there may be two properties playing the mass role, and so two candidates for mass. The
problem might be all the worse if we are in a simulation and there are multiple other simulations
as well as a non-simulated world containing us. To handle situations like this, it is important that
out structuralism includes an indexical component: mass is picked out as the property that plays
the mass role for us (or perhaps for me), in that it is the property that causes relevant experiences in
us, that governs interactions in the objects I observe, and so on. Then if we are not in a simulation,
‘mass’ will pick out a noncomputational property, and if we are in a simulation, ‘mass’ will pick
out a computational property instantiated in that simulation.
We might call this framework realizer structuralism: physical properties are picked as those
realizer properties that play a certain role. This view is analogous with realizer functionalism in
the philosophy of mind, where mental states are identified as those properties (typically physical
properties) that play a certain functional role. Realizer functionalism contrasts with role function-
alism, where mental states are identified with role properties, such as the property of having some
realizer property that plays a certain functional role. By analogy, we can define role structuralism
as the view that physical properties are identified with role properties, such as the property of
having some realizer property that plays a certain structural role.15
In the philosophy of mind, role functionalism is somewhat more popular than realizer func-
tionalism. The main reason is that there is a widely shared intuition that two functional duplicates
(a brain and its silicon functional isomorph, for example) may have the same mental states. In
these duplicates the role properties are the same, but the realizer properties are different. Given
that the mental properties are the same, it makes sense to identify mental properties with role
properties. In the case of the physical, the situation is somewhat reversed. In this case, as we have
seen, there is a strong intuition that structural duplicates (a simulation and a non-simulation, for
15Why “structuralism” in the physical case and “functionalism” in the mental case? One reason is just that different
terms are used in the different traditions. A somewhat more substantive reason is that functionalism is typically un-
derstood to involve a commitment to the roles in question being causal roles. Structuralism about the physical can be
developed with causal roles, but it need not be: there are forms of structuralism where the roles are defined without
the use of causal notions, and even without the use of nomic notions. The more general term “structuralism” serves
better to accommodate views such as these. That said, the terms can be used in various ways, and it is not entirely
unreasonable to understand structuralism as a sort of functionalism about the physical.
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example) have quite different physical properties. To accommodate this intuition, it makes sense
to identify physical properties with realizer properties.
That said, there are certainly some concepts for which something like role structuralism is
correct. One plausible case, as we have already seen, involves mental concepts such as belief,
say, which arguably picks out a role property. Another case is the concept of a computer, or of
computation, which is plausibly definable as a role property involving the existence of certain
realizer properties that play certain complex roles. It may be that various social properties, such
as that of being a philosopher, are also best understood as role properties.
Importantly, the anti-skeptical argument I have given above works equally well given both role
structuralism and realizer structuralism. All that is required is conceptual equivalence between
physical terms and structural sentences. We will get this equivalence whether mass is equivalent
to “the property that actually plays the mass role” or “the property of having some property that
plays the mass role”. If mass was identical to the role property, the anti-skeptical argument would
be even more straightforward: in an evil-demon situation, the same role property would be present,
and the same mass facts would be present. But realizer structuralism is good enough, since this
has the consequence that if we are actually in the evil-demon situation, objects still have mass.
Anti-Structuralism about Space
There remains a strong intuition that Cartesian scenarios are skeptical scenarios, and that ordinary
physical claims are false in Cartesian scenarios. Many people think it is obvious that even if we
are in a simulation or being stimulated by an evil demon, most of our physical beliefs are false.
Sometimes the intuition is expressed in terms of notions such as solidity and heaviness: if I am
in a Cartesian scenario, objects are simply not solid or heavy as they seem to be. Sometimes it is
expressed in spatial terms: if I am in a Cartesian scenario, there are not the objects out there in
space in front of me as there seem to be.
The intuitions here are distinct from and run deeper than those in the previous section. They
are not addressed simply by distinguishing role and realizer structuralism, and they arise just as
strongly when we think of the Cartesian scenario explicitly as a first-person epistemic possibility.
These intuitions reflect anti-structuralist intuitions about physical notions such as mass and space.
The underlying thought is that we have a nonstructural grasp of what it is to have mass or to occupy
space. We do not just grasp mass as what plays the mass role, and we do not just grasp space as
what plays the space role. Rather, we have some sort of grasp of mass and space as they are in
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themselves.
In the current framework, this comes out by saying that notions such as mass and space should
not be Ramsified. Certainly it is formally possible to Ramsify mass and space, finding a mass
role and a space role, and formulating Ramsey sentences about what plays these roles. But on the
anti-structuralist view, “the property that plays the mass role” will not be equivalent to “mass”,
and “the property that plays the space role” equivalent to “space”, precisely because we have a
nonstructural grasp on mass and space.
This move can be made at the theoretical level, holding that mass and space should not be
Ramsified away within theories. It can also be made at the observational level, holding that mass
and space are observational concepts that should not be Ramsified away. I will discuss the obser-
vational version of the objection, but most of what I say about the case of mass and space below
will apply to the theoretical version as well.
A move like this could in principle be made for any observational concept, including that of
color. An opponent might hold that we have a direct and nonstructural grasp of redness as an
intrinsic quality of things in the world, and that ‘red’ is not equivalent to anything like ‘the normal
cause of experiences as of redness’. If this is right, then the structure sentences that are equivalent
to physical sentences may include ‘red’ as an ineliminable observational term. If so, then premise
2 will be implausible or at least unjustified, since it is implausible or at least so far unjustified that
Cartesian scenarios contain things with the same colors as corresponding non-Cartesian scenarios.
On the face of it the relevant virtual objects need not be red, for example. So it is at least far from
obvious that structure sentences involving redness will be satisfied in the scenario.
In the case of color, there is a natural response. Perhaps there is some intuition that we have
a nonstructural concept of redness as a property of things in the world: for example, we arguably
grasp as a certain primitive quality that I have called Edenic redness in experience. But there is
little reason to think that this quality is instantiated, or that it is required for our ordinary color
claims to be correct. Science suggests that colors experiences are caused by complex physical
properties with little resemblance to Edenic redness. Even so, we still correctly say that apples are
red. So our ordinary concept of redness seems not to be the nonstructural concept. It is something
much more like the structural concept that picks out whatever property normally causes a certain
sort of experience. Correspondingly, it is plausibly the structural concept of redness that plays a
role in observationally constraining our conception of the physical world.
Something similar applies to mass, and to related observational concepts such as heaviness and
solidity. Here again there may be some intuition that we have a nonstructural concept of intrinsic
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massiveness or solidity. But even when it turns out that objects are mostly empty space, we still
say they are solid. The reason is that our central concept of solidity is structural: it is roughly the
concept of what resists penetration in certain ways. The same goes for mass. Our central concept
of mass is structural: it is roughly the concept of what is hard to accelerate, what is subject to
gravity, and what normally causes certain experiences of heaviness. There is not much reason to
think that something beyond this is required to satisfy our claims about mass.
The hardest case is that of space. Here, as in the case of color, there can be a strong intuition
that we have a direct and nonstructural grasp of properties like shape, size, and relative location.
Our grasp on what it is to be square, for example, is not reducible to a grasp on what causes square
experiences. And it may be held that perhaps unlike the case of color, there is a reasonable case
that objects in the world really have these special spatial properties, and that they are required to
do so in order for our ordinary claims about the physical world to be true.16
I think the case of space is broadly analogous to the case of color. Perhaps ordinary experience
affords us a nonstructural grasp of primitive spatial properties involving what we might call Edenic
space. But there is little reason to think these properties are instantiated in the world. For a start,
relativity theory suggests that spatial properties are not absolute but instead are relative to reference
frames, while widely held versions of quantum mechanics and string theory suggests that space
may not be primitive at all. These developments suggest that our world may be quite unlike a
world with Edenic space, but they do little to suggest that our world is not a spatial world. Even
if we are in a string-theoretic, quantum mechanical, relativistic world without Edenic space, there
still can be people who are six feet tall. If so, these nonstructural properties are not required for
our ordinary claims about space to be correct.
In other work, I have argued for spatial functionalism: the view that spatial concepts are func-
tional concepts, picking out spatial properties in virtue of their functional role. In particular, spa-
tial properties are picked out by their role in motion (roughly, objects tend to change their spatial
properties continuously), interaction (roughly, objects close together tend to have stronger inter-
actions), and observation (roughly, spatial properties are those that normally bring about certain
16Jonathan Vogel (forthcoming) argues against structuralism about space and the associated response to skepticism.
He focuses largely on role structuralism (where spatial properties are identical to structural properties) rather than
realizer structuralism, but some of his arguments may also bear on realizer structuralism. Christopher Peacocke (2014)
argues against spatial functionalism from a phenomenal externalist viewpoint on which spatial experience is directly
constituted by external properties. I respond to these arguments in Chalmers 2014. That said, Vogel’s abductivism and
Peacocke’s phenomenal externalism have their own resources as non-structuralist responses to skepticism.
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spatial experiences). This view can be supported by an examination of the role of space in various
physical theories, as well as by appeal to thought-experiments in which different properties play
the relevant roles. If this is right, then our core grasp on space is structural. Like mass and color,
spatial terms can be Ramsified out of our physical theories.
Perhaps the best way for an opponent to resist the arguments of this paper is to deny spatial
functionalism and to argue for spatial primitivism, on which we have a primitive nonstructural
grasp of space. My own view is that as in the case of color, we may well have a nonstructural con-
cept of space (Edenic space), and that beliefs involving that concept may well be false in Cartesian
scenarios. However, beliefs involving that concept are also false in the actual world, since the
world of modern physics does not seem to be a world of Edenic space. So if we think our ordinary
spatial beliefs involve this nonstructural concept, we should be prepared for the consequence that
our ordinary spatial beliefs are false in the actual world. The consequence then is not so much
skepticism but a sort of negative dogmatism, on which we have good reason to think that our
ordinary physical beliefs are false.
In any case, all this affords us something of a diagnosis of our Cartesian skeptical intuitions.
There is a strong intuition that we have a nonstructural grasp of space. This intuition explains our
intuition that in Cartesian scenarios, our spatial beliefs are massively false: there are not objects
where there seem to be. That intuition in turn explains much of our intuition that in Cartesian
scenarios, we are massively wrong about the world. The view I have advocated here accommo-
dates an element of that intuition: in Cartesian scenarios, objects do not have the primitive spatial
properties that they seem to have. But in this respect Cartesian scenarios are no worse than the
actual world. And as in the case of color, the fact that objects do not have the primitive spatial
properties does not entail that our ordinary spatial claims and beliefs are false.
It may be objected that the case for spatial functionalism is partly empirical. Insofar as the
argument turns on certain physical theories supported by empirical evidence, it has limited force
against a skeptic, since the skeptic will not accept the theories in question. However, the case
for spatial functionalism does not turn on accepting these theories. Our reaction to these theories
(that even if they are true, our spatial beliefs are still true) brings out something about our spatial
concepts: roughly that their application does not require the existence of primitive space. This
conceptual moral holds whether the physical theories in question are true or false, and whether we
are in a Cartesian scenario or not.
It may also be objected that our spatial concepts may have changed or developed under empir-
ical pressure, so that even if now our spatial concepts are functional concepts, our initial concepts
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were not. I do not find this diagnosis especially plausible: I think that even using our pretheoret-
ical concepts, we were plausibly disposed to react in this way to the relevant empirical situations
all along. But even if this claim is correct, it does not do anything to support skepticism about
the beliefs we have now, which is the sort of skepticism that is the most concerning. At most, it
supports skepticism about beliefs we had in the past, which is a much weaker form of skepticism.
That said, one can at least raise the question of the epistemic status of our nonstructural beliefs
in light of skeptical considerations. I have said we have good reason to accept that there are
no Edenic colors and no Edenic space, but insofar as these reasons rest on accepting physical
theories, a skeptic may reject them. (Perhaps an evil demon in Eden is trying to mislead us into
thinking we are in a non-Edenic world?) Still, I think that even prior to accepting these physical
theories, we had reasons to be doubtful of our Edenic beliefs. Relatively straightforward reflection
suggests that many different sorts of properties could be causing our color experiences or our
spatial experiences, and there is not much strong positive reason to think that the causal basis of
these experiences should be Edenic color or Edenic space. So I think that antecedently, some sort
of skeptical doubt is the right attitude where nonstructural beliefs are concerned.
One might think of this as yielding a mixed verdict on skepticism that the nonstructuralist and
I can share: skepticism about nonstructural beliefs, nonskepticism about structural beliefs. The
main difference is that I think our ordinary beliefs about the external world are best understood
as largely structural beliefs. The situation roughly parallels two different structural realist lines
about scientific theories. One line (taken by Worrall and others) holds that scientific theories have
both nonstructural and structural elements (and that the structural elements are more secure and
robust than the nonstructural elements), while another line (taken by Russell and others) holds
that scientific theories are structural through and through. The two lines can at least agree that
structural claims about the physical world are better justified than corresponding nonstructural
claims.
All this suggests that even if I am wrong that our ordinary physical beliefs are equivalent to
structural beliefs, the structuralist response to skepticism still has some force. Insofar as the second
non-structuralist premise of the argument is correct, so that structural beliefs are true in Cartesian
scenarios, then at least structural beliefs form a core set of beliefs about the external world (namely
structural beliefs) that are not threatened by Cartesian arguments. Of course these beliefs may still
be subject to other skeptical worries (including local skeptical scenarios and the like), but this line
gives at least some purchase against the global skeptic.
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Other Anti-Structuralist Objections17
Other objections can be made to the structuralism I have relied on. One objection is that in arguing
that ordinary physical concepts such as mass and space are equivalent to structural concepts, I have
relied on more than standard structural realism. Standard structural realism makes claims about
physical theories (relativity or quantum mechanics, say) but not about ordinary physical concepts.
An obvious reply is that these physical theories use notions like mass and space, so that it is
not easy to see how structural realism could be true of the theories without these being structural
concepts. An opponent might reply, though, by saying that the theories use a technical concept
(relativistic space or gravitational mass, say) and that structuralism about this concept does not
imply structuralism about the ordinary concept. Now, insofar as physical theories are structural and
the rest of my argument works, this line will presumably concede that the theories are true at least
in full-scale Cartesian scenarios. This seems already a large concession for a Cartesian skeptic,
and it will not be easy to maintain a view where physical theories are true in these scenarios but
ordinary physical claims are not: in these scenarios, there will be gravitational mass but no mass,
and relativistic space but no space? Alternatively, the opponent can argue that even the theories
use nonstructural concepts (perhaps because they are tied to observation), but then we are back
to the line of objection in the previous section. In any case, even if structuralism about ordinary
physical concepts makes a stronger claim than structural realism about physical theories, I think
the claim is still highly plausible and can be defended against alternatives among the lines above.
A connected objection is that my structuralism about physical concepts requires descriptivism
of a sort that has been shown to be false. According to structuralism, ‘mass’ is equivalent to a
descriptive concept ‘the property that plays the mass role’, and so on. According to the objection,
this view has been ruled out by anti-descriptivist arguments such as Kripke’s modal and epistemic
arguments. Now, it is not obvious how Kripke’s arguments apply to cases such as mass and space,
and in any case it is clear that the modal argument does not have much force against realizer
structuralism, which does not claim that it is necessary that mass plays the mass role. But perhaps
a version of Kripke’s epistemic argument might be mounted to suggest that for any specific finite
description, we can find scenarios in which there is something satisfying the description but no
mass, or vice versa. If so, mass is not a priori equivalent to ‘the property that plays the mass role’.
In response: structuralism does not require that ‘mass’ be equivalent to a finite description.
Even if it can be only approximated by descriptions, successive approximations will serve the
17This section was removed from the published version for reasons of space.
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purpose of the argument. Or better, we can do without descriptions altogether. All we need is
the weaker claim that truths about mass (and about space and so on) are scrutable from a full
enough specification of the world in structural terms: roughly, given knowledge of the world in
structural terms, we can determine the truths about mass. I argue in Constructing the World that
scrutability can do much of the work of descriptivism without many of the costs: for example, it is
not threatened by Kripke’s modal and epistemic arguments. In excursus 15 of that book, I mount
a version of the structuralist response to skepticism in terms of scrutability alone.
A still broader line of objection is that the argument relies on claims about the a priori: if not
the claim that physical sentences are a priori equivalent to structure sentences, then the claim that
they are a priori scrutable from structure sentences. I have argued at length that these claims are
plausible, but it is interesting to see how far one can get without any appeal to the a priori. For
example, one could still argue that we can know on philosophical (albeit empirical) grounds that
mass is what plays the mass role and that our claims about the external world are not globally
false. Of couse if these claims are known only empirically, their basis may be questioned by the
skeptic. The same goes for other core philosophical claims behind the argument. Still, a case
against the skeptic that rests only on plausible (if empirical) philosophical background principles
is better than nothing. For some naturalists, this may count as at least some purchase against the
skeptic.
Another objection is that structuralism does not allow the possibility of local illusions.18 Say
that our structuralism says that ‘red’ is equivalent to ‘what normally causes reddish experiences’.
Then we can find a disjunctive property that always causes reddish experiences: just take the
disjunction of every property that ever causes such an experience. Such a property will presumably
be the most normal cause of reddish experiences, so it will be redness. The result is that every
object that ever causes a reddish experiences will be red, so there will be no color illusions.
This is in effect a version of Newman’s problem for structuralism, and can be responded to
the same way. At least part of the redness role requires being a reasonably natural property, and
the disjunctive property in question will not be at all natural. In some cases there can be some
pressure toward disjunctiveness, but the pressure is limited. In cases like this, we seek a balance
between normalcy and naturalness. The highly disjunctive view privileges normalcy at the expense
of naturalness and should be rejected. That said, I do not have any explicit analysis of just how
to analyze structural concepts in terms of naturalness and normalcy. Articulating the specific
18Thanks to Nick diBella, Melissa Ebbers, and Alex Sandgren for pressing this objection.
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conditions for reference in cases like this is a challenge for theories of reference quite generally,
and I am not offering an answer to it, but I do not think the challenge is harder for structuralism
than for other theories of reference.
A final objection is that the structuralist response to skepticism is overly intellectualist, since it
requires subjects to know the truth of structuralism and of veridicalism in order to have knowledge
of the external world.19 In response: there is no such requirement. To undermine the traditional
Cartesian argument at the start of the paper, it suffices to undermine the case for the second premise
(if we cannot know that the evil-demon hypothesis is false, we cannot know we have hands). The
case for this premise rests on a presumed entailment from the evil-demon hypothesis to our having
hands. If structuralism is true, there is no such entailment—at least for the neutrally stated evil-
demon hypothesis—and the traditional argument is undermined. This removes the corresponding
threat to knowledge even for subjects who have never entertained structuralism or skepticism.
A refined version of the objection appeals to a non-neutrally stated evil-demon hypothesis
according to which the demon is globally deceiving us (we do not have hands, and so on). As
discussed earlier, a structuralist will hold that hypotheses like this are incoherent. The objector
responds that if a subject does not know that structuralism or incoherentism is true, their mere
truth will not enable them to exclude the hypothesis in question. If they cannot exclude it, they
are subject to a version of the original argument involving this hypothesis, leading to global skep-
ticism.
At this point the opponent is raising a general issue for incoherentist responses for skepticism:
do they vindicate knowledge of the external world only for subjects who know that the putative
skeptical hypotheses are incoherent? I think not. The closure principles needed to justify the
second premise here—for example, if one cannot know q, and ¬q entails ¬p, then one cannot
know p—are certainly false when the hypothesis q is incoherent. If it were true, our inability to
know certain highly complex logical theorems would entail that we have no knowledge at all, since
the negation of these theorems (which we cannot exclude) entails the negation of all propositions.
Perhaps for subjects who actually entertain the skeptical argument and believe the incoherent
skeptical hypothesis to be coherent, there is a remaining threat to their ordinary knowledge that
requires more than structuralism to overcome. But for ordinary subjects who are not thinking
about these matters, it is hard to see a threat to their knowledge here.
19Thanks to Michelle Dyke and Stephen Schiffer for raising this objection.
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Structuralist and Externalist Anti-Skepticism
The structuralist reply to global skepticism shares some elements with the externalist response
discussed earlier. Both views hold that brains in vats have true beliefs about their environment, and
refer to causally connected properties in their environment that are distinct from the properties that
their nonenvatted duplicates refer to. At the same time, there are also important differences. We
can see this by first tracing the connections between structuralism and externalism more generally.
Structuralism is consistent with both externalism and internalism about reference. To a first
approximation, realizer structuralism goes naturally with externalism, while role structuralism
goes naturally with internalism.
Where realizer structuralism applies to a given expression, the expression will pick out the
realizer that plays a certain role in the speaker’s situation. This realizer will typically vary in dif-
ferent environments even if the speakers are identical. For example, ‘mass’ may pick out a certain
physical property for me and a certain virtual property for my brain-in-vat twin, who inhabits an
environment where the virtual property plays the relevant structural role. So realizer structuralism
leads naturally to externalism about reference. By contrast, role structuralism leads naturally to
internalism, since my twin and I will pick out the same role properties, at least as far as the frame-
work described so far is concerned. For example, ‘computer’ may pick out the same role property
for both me and my twin.
The mapping between role/realizer structuralism and internalism/externalism is not entirely
cut and dried. There could be cases or views where realizer structuralist is internalist, perhaps be-
cause only one property can realize the relevant role in any environment. There could also be cases
or views where role structuralism is externalist, because the role itself depends on environmental
factors (perhaps because one is externalist about structural concepts such as causation). Still, there
is at least a natural correlation between the two.
Importantly, because structuralism is consistent with both internalism and externalism, the
structuralist reply to skepticism does not turn on externalism. We have seen that whether role
structuralism (internalist) or realizer structuralist (externalist) is true, the anti-skeptical strategy
works equally well either way. In numerous cases (such as ‘mass’), the realizer structuralist view
is more plausible than the role structuralist view, but if we had spoken a different language in
which ‘mass’ had picked out the role property rather than the associated realizer property, the
argument against skepticism would still have gone through. So it is really the structuralism that is
doing the central work in responding to the skeptic, not the externalism.
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The differences between structuralism and externalism also allow the structuralist to reply eas-
ily to the objections to externalist replies to skepticism raised earlier. The first objection, that
Putnam’s externalist route to veridicalism requires a crude and implausible causal theory of ref-
erence on which causal connections suffice for reference, does not arise. The structuralist reply
invokes a much less crude and more plausible structuralist theory of reference. The second objec-
tion, saying that the externalist reply cannot handle skepticism about non-Twin-Earthable claims
such as ‘I am talking with four philosophers’, is handled straightforwardly by structuralism. The
structuralist will understand non-Twin-Earthable claims by the role structuralist framework, which
allows twins to be referring to the same role properties which are instantiated in both ordinary sit-
uations and Cartesian situations.
Another difference is that where externalism tends to lead to an incoherentist reply to skep-
ticism, as with Putnam’s argument that we are not brains in vats, structuralism has much less
pressure in this direction. For skeptical hypotheses expressed using terms for which externalism
is correct, such as ‘I am a brain in a vat’, we can give a realizer structuralist analysis and it may
turn out that the hypothesis can be excluded. But there will be many other Cartesian hypotheses
expressible in internalist terms, such as ‘I am in a computer simulation’. Structuralism will give
a role structuralist analysis to these hypotheses, and there is no pressure toward incoherentism.
Beings in computer simulations can coherently entertain the hypothesis that they are in computer
simulations, and so can we. The more important work in replying to the skeptic on this view is
done by veridicalism, not by incoherentism.
All that said, it is certainly possible for externalists and structuralists to form an alliance here,
mounting a unified structuralist/externalist treatment of skeptical cases. We have seen that the
structuralist needs an element of externalism to handle cases in which it seems that simulations
have different properties from non-simulations. The externalist can also appeal to structuralism to
help spell out the needed constraints on reference, and also to handle those cases where externalism
does not seem to apply. On my view it is structuralism that is doing the most work, but externalism
is certainly playing a role, and the two views are perhaps strongest together.
Conclusion
I have argued that structuralism about the physical world, helped along by elements of abductivism
and externalism, can form the basis of a veridicalist response to global skeptical arguments about
the external world. Of course the anti-skeptical force of this response is limited. I have said
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nothing to address local skeptical hypotheses, which arguably suffice for the skeptic to cast doubt
on all of our beliefs, one at a time. I have said nothing to address skepticism about other minds,
or about induction, or about one’s own reasoning. And I have said nothing to address forms of
skepticism that arises from sources other than the consideration of skeptical hypotheses. It may be
that structuralist considerations will help address some of these skeptical worries, but this remains
to be seen. Still, this response to global skepticism at least addresses skepticism in one of its most
virulent forms and offers a small foothold in replying to skepticism more generally.
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